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GOV~HN1'1'2::1H

OIL .POLlOt AND ITS

[~FFECT

ON DOi'IESrIC & CJFF.srlOR.E; OIL ?J:10DUCTI ')N'

12 Apr-t L,

197?

Government Oil P011cy qnn Its Effect
On

Do~estic

& Offshore 011

Pronuct1.~n

To date the petroleum industry is second only to the
Department of Defense ln its stimulation of ocean technology.
By the end of 1968, American petroleum companies had invested
over 13 billion dollars on the cont inental shelves of t'le
United States. The development of submersibles, man in the
sea, instruments, seismic surveys, mapping 9,nQ charting,
development of ocean structures and

engine~ring

profoundly effected by this massive injection

~nd

have all bepn

of

capit~l.

There are about 16,000 companies in the United Stqtes thl'lt qre
either exploring or producing petroleum.

-..

Oo~anologyc~l's

the

petroleum industry the only growth industry t n thp. '1ce cm 118:,:,'{et
1
today. Furthermore, this rapid expansion into the o o ea.ns hq.s
had important ramificatlons for the d eve l.o pmen t of Yiqbl e
legal regimes for the world's oceans a.s well as dorn8stlc boundqries, and has, through pollution, the potential to r-ut n tmurJrtR.nt
sources of protein

:~'or

the human race. It is obviously of interest,

therefore, to consider policies which affect offshore oil
exploration and development. This paper is c0nfined to anRlyzing three such economic

policies in

ter~s

of their effects

on the industry, their costs, and alterng,tives. F1.rst, the industry and its role in the demand and
nee~

consu~ptlon o~

energy

to be summarized.
An Overview of Petroleum in the U.S.
The Petroleum industry is somewhat arbitrarily div1.ded
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into the majors, the top thirty

vertic~lly int~grRted 0\1

compani e s , and the independents, wht ch incl ude lqrge 1Y1Ul t 1million dollar corporations, as well as small pr0ducers,

~e-

fin8rs, and distributors. In 1970, seven of the top twenty
U.J. industrial corporations by sales, and nine of the twenty
largest by assets were oil companies. Gross assets
largest oil companies amounted to

]~

the seven

52.3 billion dollars.

P~ofits

of dtandard Oil (New Jersey) which by assets is the largest
corporation in the w,)rld, were equal to the combined profi ts
of General Motors and Ford.

2

The size of the majors, however, conceals the fqct thRt
the independents have traditionally been respostble

fo~ i~por-

tant innovations and discoveries tn the oil business,

PRrtl~u-

larly in exploration and production. For this reason an

t~por-

tant interrelationship exists between the maiors and indeuendents. As the oil industry is now concentrating on the
lucrative Offshore fields, this

pa'~tern

~~re

is being disturbed.

A small independent cannot afford, risk, or aqu1re the
aus amounts of capital required for these

operati~ns.

tre~end-

The 1Y191ors

are therefore becoming increasingly important in explorRtinn
and production.
Domestic oil companies also have the world's largest
market. The United States consumes

35% of the crune 011

in the world, compared to Europe which uses

zgt

p~oduced

and the U.S.S.q.

which uses only 12%. We consume 62% of the wor1d's natur9'
compared to

~urope

~9S,

which uses 9%, and the U.S.S.H wht ch uses

14,i.3 Th e development of the nat ur-aL gas industry t n the Unt t.ed
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or a
no

reserve/producti~n

ch~nges

reti) of 10.7/1. If by 1977 thorp

ln our state of technology, no geological

we~p

~tscov~~ies,

and no change in Gur economic policies, we would be out of
oil. Obviously, all these constraints have been

~ltered ~uring

the decade. Nevertheless, our reserve/ proQuction rAtio continues to drop. 011 reserves have remained relatively

const~nt,

while demand has increased steadily. If the United states is
to maintain a reserve/production rati,) of 10/1, the "Jepartmp.nt
of the Interior forcasts that we will have a deficit of

4

billion barrels by 1980, and an 18 billion barrel 1efictt by
the year 2000.

6

In solving this deficit, the United States fqces
The first possibility is that we can

i~port

~

1tle~mq.

the otl we need.

vihile the United Jtates has a reserve/productLm rA,ti') of 10/."
the world's is 50/1 and rapid discoveries are increasing

th~t

margin. The second possibility is that the United States cqn
rely on domestic production by raising the price of crUQA oil
to the point where domestic

product~oh becomeseconomi~~lly

justified. In a recent studY,rhe Petroleum Provinces 0f The
United Jtates, the National Petroleum Council has conclu1ed that
the potential petroleum resources of this country are
Ahile many estimates have been made that are severql

'm~ense.

o~~e~s

0~

magnitUde apart, this study indicates that there 8re qhnut
720 billion barrels of oil in place, of which ,qhrmt 1 qo hi 11 ton
lie on the continental shelf. Other studies have indtcated that
up to 2 trillion barrels are
400 billion in tar sands

I

loc~ed

in oil shales, and another

AS3uming that we recover

50t

o~ this
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potential oil in place,

~nd

that our demand should Qnuble to

10 billion barrels a year, we still

h~ve

enough

petroleu~

to

last at least 150 more years.
To summarize, then, the United

St~tes f~ces

no

~eal shortq~e

of Petroleum. The question revolves around how much we
willing to pay in order to use our own reserves. 1n
the

econo~ic

policies the 30vernment has

ad~pted

~rp.

exq~tnt~~

for thp. pe-

troleum industry, it is important to View them in this context.
I have presented these policies in the

chronolo~inql o~der 0~

their development, which is the reverse of thetr cost to the
consumer.
Government Policy and the 011 Industry
a.) Depletion Allowances
Depletion allowances were inacted because extractive industries use up their means of production in the
duction. Depletion

~rocess

of nro-

allowances qre different than denrectatt1n

allowances in that they bear no relation to the vRlue of
asset (the producing property), or to the expected

th~

lt~e o~ th~

asset. A producer may deduct the fUll vqlue of his denlet10n
allowance as long as he is prJducing oil.
Under current regulations, a producer

~ay

his gross income as long as it does not exceed

deduct ??% of

50%

of his

taxable income. Inpractice this has a~ounted to a tax saving
to the oil companies of 1,) billion dollars in recent years. 9
Additionally, oil companies may deduct intangible drilling costs
such as contractors fees and services. An examinAtion of oil

-6-

company profits in 1969 reveals that Gulf Oil pqid O.9~ of
its profits in taxes. Texaco 2.4%. and Atlantlc Richfield
1.2'1>. 'I'he majors paid an ave rag e of

710 of their praft ts tn

taxes compared to 42% for all industrial corporations. 9
It is maintained that this tremendous tax

advqnta~e

is

necessary in order to reduce the risk qssociaten with exnloTation of new oil fields. Since under existtng
an oil company may deduct

·ct

re~ul~t'_0ns,
f01"'P' ~Y!

d e pl eti on allowance on

as well as domestic holdings. lt is q uea t t oriab'l e whether this
practice stimulates domestlc drilling as much

qg

it shouln.

It would certainly provide more of an incentive if it

~~re

applied exclusively to domestic holdings.
b.) Market Demand Prorationing
Pr-o r-a t t orn.ng is a system of restricting 011 nr-oduc t t on
in the Uni ted 3tates. ost~ibly to ins ure pr,yper coris e r-v« tt on
practices are enforced. Historically. these regulqttons

~Tew

out of the chaotic conditions which eXisted in the 0i1 innustry during the depression. The "rule of capture;"
princ~e

q

lp~ql

developed by the courts, was interpr.eted to '1'\.e"m

that oil belopged to whoever brought it to the surface. ll..n
oil discovery quickly resulted in a frenzy of activity qimed at
bringing all the oil to the surface as fast as possible. F0r
geological reasons this created huge wastes. for the ultimqte
recovery of an oil field is inversely proportional to the
rate at which the 011 ls removed.
In practice. however. prorationing has become a prtce
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setting
J

~echan!s

•

~ells

r e n ot
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1
~

pro~
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n t
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r ated a t all .
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tAd by the
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nee~

shape of the supply curves

to be conslnered to

qp~rp.ct~te

t.n i s rac t , Oil production involves heavy Lnve s t.merrt in ftxerl
actu~l

assets. but is characterized by low variable costs tn

+

production. rhus in the absence of resrictlons. an efficient
producer can cover his fixed and variable costs. even

~ith

price reduction, by simply pumping more oil. For

reason

supply curve 3

1

thl~

a

s~~ll

tends to be elastic. In other words, a

increase in price results in a large increase in output.
rhe inefficient producer. however, is unable to

cove~

all his costs at a low price for cruQe oil bAcause his wells
lack the physical capacity to produce at higher

~utputs. ~hts

results in the more inelastic supply curve 8 2 " In thts ca8e,
restrictions have been placed on the efficient proQucers, so
increases in output are met

by marginal operators who

can only operate at high crude oil prices. Tn effect.

deill~nd

m~r~et

prorationing legislates in!ficienCy into the 011

tn~ustry.

Prorationing also reduces the incentives to find high
capacity wellsslnce their production will be restricted. Instead, the emphasis is pl9.ced on deep wells, and low capacity
stripper or near stripper wells Nich have large

"allowahlp.8."

In a study conducted in 1964, &delman calCUlated that 78~ of
the new wells drilled in Texas were superfluous. 10
'I'h e Federal government supports
rhe fi rs t is the Co'hallY

pr-or-a t t on t ng tn t'l>10

1~qyS.

nHot Oi lit Act, which pr-oh t bi ts 0'\. 1

produced in excess of a state quota from moving in interstate
c omm er-c e , 'I'he second 1s the policy of the government to "lpoly
an"allowable."based upon that of the adjacent state, to wells
on the outer

continent~l

shelf.
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This

lat~er

policy has significance for the offshore

011 business. Offshore oil

w~

hs:tve been dri:led into less

risky. and highly productive fields. For the r eas ona out i t ned
invest~ent even
were
with a reduction in crude oil price. if there/no restrictions

above. these wells would remain an attractive

on production. There is also no justification for prorati 0 n i n g
on the grounds of conaervatnon , since the size

~nd

"l'll,)unt of

control exercised on government leases precludes Door
tion practices. Proof of this lies in tht=!

f~ct

t ha t

con8er1r~-

Sqlifor,.,'_~

has no prorationing system at all. sinCA the productive
of the state can be entirely absorbed by the market

C~P9C,tv

ie~~ni

for

oil.

'---

c. The Mandatory Oil Inport

~uota

It can be readily seen that pror"itioning could not survive
if cheap foreign oil were allowed to flood U.S.

mar~ets.

It is

necessary to limit imports so domestic prices Can rise above
the world price.
The present quota system grew out of conditions that
in the

post-~orld

War II oil

industry.

Beginin~

in

t~e

e~lsten
t=!~r]y

1950's. American oil companies made heavy invest~ents in the
Middle East. At this t i ae the world price c l.o s e Ly f011o T'1 i"'ri th",
GUlf coast price. consequently imports were s'!l~11. The tre~endoes size and low cost of Middle Eastern reserves prevented
this condition from lasting. As foreign crude oil prices iropped
rapidly. imports shared a growing fraction of the dO'llestic mqrketo After the duez crises in 1956. domestic producers raised
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the price of crude oil 40 cents, ~nd M1d~lp 89stArn qnd

.s out.h

Amer-i.can imports reached a

level that the~ovPT'n'1lpnt

considered dangerous for national security. In

1957 a volun-

tary quota was adopted. However, because quotas were alloC'lten
on the basis of how much oil individual companies were i'1l'Oorting prior to

1957, those companies with recent foreign invest-

ments were at a disadvantage. The failure of the voluntqTy
program lead President 2is

cnhower

to env oke the na t t.o ns L

security clause of the Trade Agreements Act,
Mandantory Oil

I~port ~uota

tn

~nd

1959. In part the

imuose

q

pro~lq~qtton

read:
"The new program is designed to insure a s t.ab le heql.thy
industry in the United 3tates capable of exploring for
and developing new hemispere reserves to replace those
being depleted. 'I'he basis of the new program, 11 '-<e thqt
for the voluntary program, is the certified reqUirements
of our national securi ty which mak e i t necess~ry t:hqt we
preserve to the greatest extent possible a Vigorous healthy
~ petroleum industry in the United states." 11
The mandantory import quota is administered by the Denq,..tment of Interior

~nd

the Office of Emergency

Prep~redness.

With

the exce pt i on of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Ls La.nd.s , the Un t t ed
States is diVided into five districts para.llelling those used
for oil and gasoline rationing in 'world

-~'Jar

II.

QU()t~s

q.re set

at 12.2% of the estimated production far a gtven year. However,
since the volume of imports is in

~qny

cqses a pol' tical questton,

the Department of Interior has lowered its

estl~ates

of UT00UC-

tiun when they have been"t01 high."
~here

are several exemptions from the quota. Mextco ts

granted an overland exemption, but

negoti~tions

With P8mex. the

-11-

national oil company of I1exico, have resulted in
restriction on imports of 30,000

bar~els

overland exemption was cancelled by

per

11

d~y.

Presid~nt

voluntf'lry

A

C~n~~l~n

Nixon in 1970.

Add i, tiona lly, risidua,l oil is allowed t nto rli strt cts I

thJ"'~UR;h

IV, and number 2 heating oil is a l'_owed into New Eng'_'lnd.
It is important to consider how import licenses

~re

j?

9110-

cated since they represent a clear windfa11 to the refiner
who can obtaln one. Generally, licenses are al1oc8ted on thA
historical basis of what the company was importing prior to
the initiation of the voluntary quota. There is als0 a sliding
scale which allows the smaller refiner to import a gre9ter
amount of oil. While companies are not allowed to sell their
import licenses, they are allowed to trade them for 011.

Sm~ll

ref1ners who are at some distance from a shipping port may
find it advantages to trade their licenses to

9.

major cO"T\l)qny_

who, in turn, can import oil from one of its overseas

0o~r~tlons.

In several recent years the total amount of imports allowed
have not been used.
fa appreciate the effect of the quota on the

do~estic

oil market it is necessary to compare the world .qnd domestic
prices for oil.
l'Uddle t:astern
Wellhead price
Freight
Gathering price
'rariff
Dockside Price
( Eas t Coas t )

Louisiana Gulf C08st

$1.43

Source:

.74

.10
2.27
The Q!l Imoort Question
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--

be
without the quota, U.cl. wellhead price would/equ~lto the
world dockside price less domestic freight ~nd g~therin~ chAr~p,s
or i1.68. (This represents what the price

woul~ h~ve be~n

in

1970) Pu t ur e changes in the world lind domestic pr t ce s d.epe nd
on several variables. Jorld freight rates will continue to gn
down with the advent of the new generation of supertqnkers,
but the OPEC may

demand higher prices.

Do~estic

prices qre

likely to rise if we continue to rely on U.S. reserves.
It is difficult to measure the precise cost of the
to the American economy. The Cabinet Task Force on 0\1

quot~

est'~~te~

that the cost of the quota to the consumer WqS 5 billion dollArs

13

in 1J69.-Yhis figure represents the difference betwean
oil on the world market and the domestic

rnar~et. Th~5

~uy\ng

Bi'lion

dollars is essentially an oil company tax, which on a per

c~pitq

basis is $2~.
The oil industry maintains that this money is returned to
the American pUblic in the form of stock diVidends, state

t~xes,

royalies, and other payments. ,Jhile this is true, the income
redistribution is unequal. Revenues accrue to the five oil producing states, resulting in the non producing states pAying

~

higher share of the cost of the quota. Rhode Island Pqys t)?
per capita and Vermont pays

$45.1~oughlY

90% of the stock diVi-

dends are paid to 10% of the popUlation.
rhere are other economic costs qS well.

~

high price for

oil, maintained as it is by prorationing, allows
in the industry. Capital

~nd

inef~ictency

other resources qre attracted to the

industry that would not be employed without high prices. More

-13-

energy entensive techniques of product10n Rre not used.
The justiftcatlan for these

econl~ic

costs qndthe con-

tinuatlon of the quota falls into five general

Cqteg0r~es:

national security, balance of paynents, the future world
price of oil, the loss of labor, and the need tl

sti~ulqte

domestic exploration. Each of these arguments deserves cAreful
consideration.
rhe national_ security requirements of the United

3~atp.s

are the most frequently cited arguments, as well as the legql
justification for the quota. National security has basically
two components. The first is that we shoUld not hecome overly
dependent upon foreign sources that are located in

pol~tic~lly

unstable areas. The second is the need for a secure supryly of
oil in case of an actual conflict. In discussibg'thts lqt,ter
requirement, it is necessary to conceptualize the types of
conflicts that might involve the United States.
The most likely conflict is the limlted, guerrilla war
such as we are now fighting in Viet Nam. A conflict of this
nature is not likely to produce a serious oil supply problem.
As evidence, over 90% of the oil used in Viet Nam comes from
the Persian Gulf states, even though they have repeatedly

15

objected to our policies. There Was also no supply problem
during the Korean War.
While a conventional, non-nuclear war

such

qS

~orld

War II is an unlikely event, there are several qlternattves
to having an import quota. Conversion from civilian to
uses, stockpiling, and rationing are all possible.

mtl_tt~ry

C~nadiq~

-14-

Mexican, and other hemispheric

reserv~s ~re

easily

~s

se~ur~

th~

as our own reserves, yet thaey are restricted under

pr~s~nt

quota. It is also worth-while to observe th~t the concentratton
~qkes

of refining and production facilities in this country
them

exc~llent:

targets for sabotage and stratigic bombing.

Import quotas have done nothing to solve this problem.
If the United States

becom~

involved in a

nucle~r

oil will playa minute role. Since nuclear weapons
to be directed against population centers

r~ther

qr~

war,
likely

than industriql

complexes, there would be an excess capacity of oil production
after such a conflict.
lhe Six Day w'ar in the lIiIidtHe East in 1967 is 8, ~o,d
test of the effectivess of thelmport quota. For ten dqys

q~~~r

the conflict all production from Middle

~~ric~n

S~stern

8nn Nnrth

fields ceased, and normal production did not resume for three
months. The fact that U.S. producti~n incr~ased by 12~ is cl~tm~d
by the petroleum industry to be proof of the wisdom of maintaining

the quota. It is questionable whether U.S. oil did in

fact save the day for

Eur~~and

Japan. It should be noted that

the Middle East conflict was of short duration, occurred during
the summer months when there was a smaller d ema nd for oil,
that Iran did not go along with the

boycot~

and an

capacity existed that could bring the oil around

~

"

exc~ss t~nker

th~

Cape of

~0od

Hope. If any of these fq.ctors had not been so after t he '.fidr'l1 e
East conflict, there would have been acute
It is also informative to

loo~

supply

prob'.~ms.

at the bottlenecks that

developed ~s the IU.~. industry expanded production. Transnortatton

-15-

~nd

th~

pipelines from Canada proved to be ina.deauqte since

quota had restricted Canadian

i~ports. Reftntn~ ca~~ctty b~c~~~
c~n

the most important limiting factor. however. gnd it
shown that the quota Was responsible f0r this. The

be

quot~.

by

maintaining a high price for crude oil. reduces the mqrgtn between a

refine~s

costs and the price of the finished oils he

markets. A low price for crude oil increases the margtn

~nd

thus acts as an incentive for companies to become refiners.
~dditional

refiners mean excess capacity which can be used in

an emergen4y. Since the major oil companies control both

th~

refining and production phases of the oil business. high crude
oil prices have little effect on their business. The

m~10rs

prefer high crude prices because it tends to drive out p0tential competitors.
To summarize. it is doubtful that the
be

quot~

hgs

been~br ~ill

. necessary for our national security. By relying an 0ur 00mes-

tic reserves we are fastly

deplet~rtg

our own low C0st fuel

resources. If we imported oil and only relied on domestic

r~serv~s

during an emergency. we could meet our national security objectives
at a fraction of the cost.
The second justification for the quota is that our balance
of payments deficit would grow if we

i~ported

our oil.

Cabinet 'rask Force on Oil estimated that if the
of oil were allowed to fall to

$2.50

p~r

Th~

do~estic pr~ce

barrel. 4?t of our otl

would be imported. and there would be a balanoe

0f payments

deficit of 1.3 billion dollars a year by 1980. However. thts
study does not consider that iddustries such as petrochemicals.

-16-

which alone

have
f ' generated a budget surplus of 1.3 billi~n

dollars a year, would become more attractive on the

int~r-

national market. Additionally, as capital would be diverted
away from the oil industry with lower crude prices, som~ of
this monRy would be invested in industries which

ar~ n~t

export-

~ake q

compre-

ers. These effects must be considered in order to

hens i ve eva l.ua t i on of the true balance of payments deficit.
The third argument for

th~

import quota is that the Untted

States can not be sure that the world price for oil will not
go up. The basis for this argument, which has been given

~ore

cDedence in recent months, is that an international cqrtel,
such as OPEC, will monopolize the world's reserves of netroleum
and force a price rise. This presupposes that there is gotng
to be close co-operation among all the producing states.

~tth

the current rate of exploration in the world, the number of
countries who will become petroleum exporters is rapidly increasing. Control will prove to be difficult at best. In order
to raise the price for oil, world production of oil will hqve
to be restricted under some system of prorationing. The tempt~
these
tion for individual countries to break /
r-es t r t c t r ons T'1t 11
be strong. Furthermore, there is no international

equiv~lent

n

of the Conally "Hot Oil" Act that lMll\;.l force com p'l t a no e ,
'rhe whole process of oil negotiation
a period of flux. In the past, a
owned

s~all

is going

throu~h

number of oil comnanies

almost exclusively by the United States and Great Britqin,

have dealt with the oil producing states directly

with no

consultation with the consuming states themselves. It is

-17-

impossible to believe that countries with

pow~rful ~conomtc

sanctions, such as West Germany and Japan, will

~llow

their

16

vital interests to be decided in this way in the future.
~xpressed

in the Middle East have already

interest 1n

Compqni~~

havin~

other countries make investments in their operqti0ns simply to
share the risks. As OPEC runs into stiff bargaining
is questionable how far they can

rais~

pow~r,

it

their prices.

A final c ons Ld er-a t Lon is that the U.S. price wo ut d remqtn
a ceiling that could not be
rationing, this

exceed~d

by t upo r t s , 1,,[1 thout nr-o-,

price could be considerablY lower thqn that

now prevailing in domestic markets.
The fourth argument in favor of maintaing the quota is th9t
the domestic industry w'Juld be so crippled that there 1'1ould he
a massive loss of jobs. It is maintained that over t.2 million

17

jobs would be directly affected. This is absolute nonsense. Tn
the first place, there would be no loss of jobs at all in the
refining and marketing sectors of the innustry. In fact these
sectors would actually be likely to grow, resulting in an tncrease in jobs. In the second place, the production sector of
the business, which would be adversly affected, lost over
1'1
50,000 job~ in the decade between 1959 and 1969. Pres~nt
employment in this sector is about 270,000. It is pointless
to argue that the American consumer should pay

5 billion dollars

a year in order to keep these people employed. Furth~r~ore.
it has been estimated that there would only be a

5t

loss of

production without the import quota.
The final argument for the Mandantory Import Quota is th~t
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it is necessary in order to

sti~ulate

dnmestio

~ri'ling ~nd

exploration. A cursory glance at figure 1 will show that
domestic drilling

h~s

St~t·s.

steadily declined in the UniteA

Since an adequate understanding of this also involves the
consiry~r

effectiveness of government policy, the two need to be
ed together.
Domestic and Offshore

~xploration-

A Changing Pattern

To analyze the reduction in domestic drilling, the

d~o~de

prior to 1956 needs to be examined. (see figure 2) Between

1946 and 1956 wildcat drilling tripled, increasing from 4,000
to 12,000 wells. At the same time, however, the size of the
crUde oil discovered per well dropped. The

flv~

year

~verqge

discovery per well between 1946 and 1950 was 999 thousand
barrels per well.

Betwe~n

1951 and 1955 the

averRg~ ~iscovery

was 522 thousand barrels per well. By 1960 the

avera~e

discovery

per well had dropped to 315 thousand barrels per well. Obvi0usly,
the tremendous increase in exploratory drilling did not achieve
its objective of finding new reserves. Total drilling more
than doubled during the period from 1946 to 1956, reserves
increased by less than a third.
Not surprisingly, oil companies began to lose interest
in domestic exploration. Investors felt that all the
easily accessable pools in the United States had been
This attitude has manifested itself in two ways.
expenditures

h~ve

lar~e,
disc0vere~.

~irst,

cqnlt~l

been shunted away from producti0n and directed

into different sectors of the bUsiness such as petrochemicals.
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In

1962,

73~

of all capital expenditures by oil

co~p~nt~~

were for exploration and production, but by 1967 this hq1 ~~c'tned
to 56;1>.lJecondlY, oil conpam es have s augrrt less

'r t

s ky

!1r~qs

for development. In this context, offshore oil hee become .n
attractive investment. While drilling costs are

~uch

higher

offshore, and increase rapidly with depth, Barrel yield per
foot drilled has been five times greater than onshore. A
combination of geological knowledge and a decade of
advancement combined by the late

50'e

technologic~l

to make offshore oil

an attractive investment. The disappointiftg_results onshore,
rather than the domestic price for oil, were

re~pon~ible

for

the rapid development of offshore oil production.
A comparison of the deflated "lverage wel1hean. pr-t o e of

crude oil and the rate of offshore development (figure 1) inn'\.cates that a declining price has caused no reduction in the l'!1te
of offshore development. In
was

1957 the average wellhead price

e.12 a barrel. In 1968 the deflated price, bqsed on the

Jholesale Price Index,was

$2.70 a barrel. Yet durin~ this period

offshore drilling quadrupled.
a
Not only has/~eeillining price of oil had little im~qct on
offshore
the/industry, but there is good eVidence that import quot"l~,
depletion allowances, and prorationing are unnecessary to
stimUlate development. Venezuela accounts for

47%, And the

Persian Gulf 30~ of <:111 the offshore l"1ells in the wor-Ld , arid
at wellhead prices that are in some casef'!l half the damestic
20
wellhead price. The offshore business is expandtng at 19% q
year worldWide, compared to

8%

for onshore. The world price
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has acted as an adequate incentive for worldwide develoD'l1ent,
why is LtJnot adequate for the United States

oil in~ustry?

An answer to this question leads to the ultimate contrqdiction in U.S. oil polley. ImpJrt quotas and depletion al1owances are provided as incentives for domestic exploration, but
production is prohibited for environmental reasons. Decisions
to halt lease s a Les on the outer continental s hel f of Lout s t e ns ,
B~rb~ra

to prohibit further expansion of drilling in the Santa

channel, and to hold up construction af the Alaska pipeline
Thi~

are indicative of the contradiction in our poltcies.
not to SUg6est that we should not

ad"Jpt strict

i~

envtronment~l

laws, but it makes little sense to pr-ov I d.e incentives T'1hen

w~

are not going to allow them to be used. Once again, it is thl'!
consumer who bears the ultimate cost.
Alternatives and Conclusions
Given the excessive cost and poor performance
ment incentives to the oil industry, it is

"o~

neces~ary

alternative policies. The Cabinet Task Force on oil

~nvern-

to

con~t~e~

~ecomml'!n~e~

that a tariff substituted for the import quota. It was sttDll1a.terl
that the tariff would be gradually reduced a nrl frequent reVil"!T'l
would b e mandatory • The salient difference between a
a tariff is that

revenues from imports

QO

q

u',t"

not accrue to

l'lYlJi

refine~~

lucky enough to get i'nport licenses, but t o the Federal Governmente The Cabinet Task Force proposal did not consider the wisQom
of maintaining prorationing and depletion allowances.
'The best a L ternati ve to present government poll cy is

-21-

actually a potpourri of

propos~ls.

The first is stop

efficient wells and allow supply and demand to

pror~ttn~

determin~ th~

equilibrium market price. ·rhe second is to allow fr"'''' tr"lne
in oil, or at least free trade with Jestern Hemisphere

c0untri~s.

the third is to stockpile oil in amounts sufficient to

satl~fy

our needs during an emergency. Two econJm1sts qt the

Untv..,r~1ty

"!sttmqt"!s
of V'iisconsin, rvIead and Sorensen, have cOllpleten q stuny thqtl
the price of storing a one years supply of oil qbov,,", ~rounn
21
to
be abJut 2 bill16n dollars. More recentl_y,~"!st GermRny
has experimented with techniques of storing all in
cavaties that has proved to be far

che~per.

unn"!r~r,und

The fourth 1s to

abolish depletion allowances, or at least to bring them into
line with other extractive industries,
on foreign holdings.

~he

~nd

to 13.boltsh them

fifth is that we should adopt environ-

mental laws that are consistant With our objective

of finning

petroleum. The sixth, and last proposal, is that should the
rate of domestic exploration fall to what the
a

dangero~level,

~ov""rnment

considers

then the goverment should ""ither dtrectly

SUbsidize exploration or else do its own. In this context it
is surprising to know that it was actually the U.S. Navy ,
not private industry, that discovered the trem""ndous oil
reserves on the North Slope of Al13.ska.
No attempt has been made to assess the pol1ttc~1 re13.11ty
of legis Lat Lng any of these proposals. I f the r-ec e pt ton of the
relatively mild Cabinet Task Force proposal is any tndicqtion,
opposition will be fierce. The arguments in their favor qre
true, this weakness not Withstanding. Import quotas, depletion

-22-

allowances. and market

dem~nd pror~tianing h~v~

not met

th~\r

stated obJ ect t v\"!s. It 1s time the A.merican cons umer- becS'lrne
aware of the costs of our present oil policy. and
done to change it.

l'lh~t C9.n

be
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